RANDY S. GROSSMAN Acting United States Attorney Janet A. Cabral Assistant U.S. Attorney California Bar No. 168900 Office of the U.S. Attorney 880 Front Street, Room 6293 San Diego, CA 92101 Tel: (619) 546-8715 Fax: (619) 546-7751 Email: Janet.Cabral@usdoj.gov 6 Attorneys for the Department 7 Of the Navy 8 9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT **10** SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 11 **12** Case No.: 21cv640-WQH(KSC) DENNIS M. BUCKOVETZ, an 13 individual. 14 DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS Plaintiff, FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION; **15** MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND v. 16 **AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT** THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, **17** Defendant. Hearing Date: September 14, 2021 18 NO ORAL ARGUMENT UNLESS 19 REQUESTED BY THE COURT **20** 21 The Department of the Navy has searched for and produced to Plaintiff Dennis 22 Buckovetz hundreds of emails in response to his 2015 and identical 2018 Freedom of 23 Information Act (FOIA) Requests. Nonetheless, based upon five emails produced by the 24 Navy in November of 2015, Mr. Buckovetz speculates that there were additional emails 25 **26** ¹ These are two of the more than 60 FOIA requests submitted by Plaintiff Buckovetz. See article "Knight FOI Fund provides 'meaningful vote of support' to California man seeking Marine emails," available at https://www.nfoic.org/blogs/knight-foi-fund-provides-meaningful-vote-of-support-to-california-man-seeking-marine-records/. 27

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which were intentionally deleted or destroyed by or at the direction of the former Commanding General of the Marine Corps Recruit Depot ("MCRD"), San Diego. Mr. Buckovetz speculates that these phantom emails implicate the General in a scheme to sell Marine Corps memorabilia without official oversight, and that the emails were concealed or destroyed by or at the direction of the General. As a result, Mr. Buckovetz alleges that because of the deliberate actions of the General "and those working underneath or in conjunction with him," the Navy "concealed or destroyed non-exempt records responsive to Buckovetz's FOIA Requests." Mr. Buckovetz seeks "a declaration that the prior search for the requested emails done by Defendant The Department of the Navy ("Defendant") was inadequate because Defendant, through Gen. Bierman, deliberately concealed or destroyed emails." [Complaint, ¶¶ 2, 67.]

The Court lacks jurisdiction over the claims asserted by Mr. Buckovetz. FOIA authorizes this Court to (a) enjoin the agency from withholding agency records, and (b) order the production of any agency records improperly withheld from the complainant. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B). But according to Mr. Buckovetz's Complaint, the emails he seeks no longer exist. Mr. Buckovetz's claims are based wholly upon his speculation regarding phantom emails which, according to the Complaint, have been deleted or otherwise destroyed. Mr. Buckovetz's allegations, speculating about the destruction of additional emails, do not form the basis for any relief which this Court can grant under the auspices of FOIA. Therefore, the Court should dismiss the Complaint² for lack of jurisdiction.

I. BACKGROUND

On January 23, 2015, Mr. Buckovetz submitted a FOIA request to the Marine Corps Recruit Depot, Western Recruiting Region, San Diego ("MCRD") seeking the following:

[A]ll email messages dated on or after 1 May 2014 that have any of the following email addresses Mark.Tull@usmc.mil, Jim.Gruny@usmc.mil, Michael.Lee@usmc.mil, James.Bierman@usmc.mil, Thomas.W.Spencer@usmc-mccs.org, and

² Plaintiff Lynne Bird has dismissed her claim in this case. [See Joint Motion to Dismiss and Order Thereon, Doc. Nos. 9 and 11.]

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John.Ming@usmc.mil on the "rom:", "To:", "Cc:" or "Bcc:" lines AND contain the word "coin" or "coins" on the subject line or within the body of the message.

[Complaint, ¶ 26, and Exhibit B thereto.] This FOIA request, numbered DON-USMC-2015-002772 (hereinafter "2015 Request") was referred in part to the Marine Corps Community Services ("MCCS") Headquarters in Quantico, VA. The partial referral was necessary because some of the identified email addresses were for individuals with MCCS, which uses different email servers and domains than MCRD. The MCRD uses ".mil" as an email domain whereas MCCS uses ".org." [Complaint, ¶ 27.]

On March 5, 2015, MCRD produced to Mr. Buckovetz 319 pages of records containing 384 individual emails. [Complaint, ¶ 28.] On November 23, 2015, MCCS Headquarters in Quantico responded to the referral of Mr. Buckovetz's 2015 Request and produced five additional emails that had not appeared in MCRD's March 5, 2015, production (the "Five Emails"). [Complaint, ¶ 43, and Exhibit C thereto.]

On September 3, 2018, Mr. Buckovetz submitted FOIA Request DON-USMC-2018-011145 (hereinafter "2018 Request") to Marine Corps Recruit Depot Western Recruiting Region San Diego using language identical to that contained in DON-USMC-2015-002772. [Complaint, ¶ 50, and Exhibit D thereto.] Mr. Buckovetz submitted the 2018 Request to allow him to compare the production with those previously provided in response to his 2015 Request. [Complaint, ¶ 51.] Specifically, Mr. Buckovetz believed that the response from MCRD regarding the 2015 Request should have contained the five additional emails which he received from MCCS in response to the 2015 Request. [Complaint, ¶ 44.] On September 17, 2018, MCRD administratively closed the 2018 FOIA request as duplicative of the 2015 Request. [Complaint, ¶ 52.]

Mr. Buckovetz administratively appealed the denial of the 2018 Request, and on December 5, 2018, filed suit alleging a violation of the FOIA based upon the Defendant's application of its internal policy regarding duplicative requests, Case No. 18cv2736-WQH-MDD(KSC). [Complaint, ¶¶ 53 and 63, and Exhibit F thereto.] Mr. Buckovetz in that case

also challenged the adequacy of Defendant's search for records in response to his 2015 and 2018 FOIA Requests, pointing out that MCRD did not produce the five emails he received from the MCCS response to his 2015 Request. Mr. Buckovetz, however, voluntarily dismissed his claim regarding the adequacy of these prior searches without prejudice upon agreement of the parties. [Complaint, ¶¶ 63-64, and Exhibits G and H thereto.] Nonetheless, during the scope of subsequent motion proceedings, Plaintiff continued to raise issues regarding the adequacy of the Navy's search for responsive emails. As a result, Defendant filed along with its motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction a declaration setting forth the full scope of its search of all locations likely to contain responsive documents. [See Case No. 18cv2736-MDD(KSC), Doc. No. 34-1.] The Court subsequently dismissed Mr. Buckovetz's claim relating to the application of Defendant's duplicative request policy, concluding that Plaintiff had not shown he had been harmed by the application of the policy pertaining to duplicative requests.³ [Complaint, ¶ 65; see also Case No. 18cv2736-WQH-MDD(KSC), Doc. No. 38 (Order of Magistrate Judge Dembin, filed May 7, 2020, granting Defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction).]

Mr. Buckovetz, in his current complaint, does not specifically identify any particular document or email which has been withheld from production by Defendant. He does not identify any location where Defendant could or should have looked which was likely to contain additional responsive documents. To the contrary, Mr. Buckovetz speculates there *may have been* additional responsive emails, which he also speculates were destroyed. [Complaint, ¶¶ 1-2.]

³ On October 18, 2018, Mr. Buckovetz's spouse, Lynne Bird, submitted a separate FOIA Request to MCRD, DON-USMC-2019-000608, seeking the same emails Mr. Buckovetz had requested in his 2015 and 2018 Requests. [Complaint, ¶ 54.] Ms. Bird received all of the same emails previously produced by the Department of the Navy from the MCRD email server responsive to the 2015 Request. In responding to Ms. Bird's FOIA Request, the Navy also located certain additional email documents, and produced those to Ms. Bird. Although Mr. Buckovetz's 2015 Request, at that point, was closed, Defendant also produced the additional records to Mr. Buckovetz pursuant to his duplicative 2018 Request. Therefore, Magistrate Judge Dembin concluded that Mr. Buckovetz had not shown he was harmed by the application of the Defendant's policy against processing duplicative requests.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

FOIA is a statutory scheme under which individuals may request access to federal agency documents. See 5 U.S.C. § 552. The statute sets forth the procedures for requesting documents, and carves out nine categories of documents that are exempt from disclosure. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b). A FOIA requestor who exhausts administrative appeals and is unsatisfied with the agency's response may file litigation in federal court. Id. at § 552(a)(4)(B). In a FOIA case, as in others, a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) challenges the Court's subject matter jurisdiction. A lack of jurisdiction is presumed unless the party asserting jurisdiction establishes that it exists. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Thus, the plaintiff bears the burden of proof on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Sopcak v. Northern Mountain Helicopter Serv., 52 F.3d 817, 818 (9th Cir. 1995).

When a plaintiff makes a FOIA claim, "federal jurisdiction is dependent upon a showing that an agency has (1) 'improperly'; (2) 'withheld'; (3) 'agency records." Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. For Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 150 (1980). "Judicial authority to devise remedies and enjoin agencies can only be invoked . . . if the agency has contravened all three components of this obligation." *Id*.

III. ARGUMENT

Mr. Buckovetz's claim under FOIA should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because he does not allege any documents within the Defendant's possession or custody are being withheld from production. Instead, Mr. Buckovetz speculates that because there were five emails located on the MCCS.org server, which were not produced by the Navy from the MCRD.mil server, there *could have been* additional emails that once existed on the MCRD.mil server which he further speculates were destroyed or concealed by or at the direction of the MCRD Commanding General so they could not be produced in response to his 2015 FOIA Request. These speculative claims are not ones over which this Court has jurisdiction under FOIA.

The Supreme Court made clear in the seminal case of Kissinger v. Reports Comm.

for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136 (1980), that FOIA jurisdiction is triggered by the agency having actual possession of the requested documents, and that federal courts have no authority to order the production of records not in the possession of the agency. At issue in *Kissinger* was the authority of the federal courts, under FOIA, to order production of documents which were no longer in the possession of the State Department. Throughout his Government service as Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger had prepared summaries and transcripts from electronic or stenographic recordings of his telephone conversations. Those telephone notes were stored in his office at the State Department. *Id.* at 140. While still Secretary of State, Kissinger arranged to move the notes from his office in the State Department to the New York estate of Nelson Rockefeller. Thereafter, Kissinger first deeded what he deemed to be his private papers, which did not include the telephone notes, to the United States, in care of the Library of Congress. Kissinger later donated a second collection of papers to the Library of Congress, including the telephone notes. *Id.* at 141-42.

Three separate FOIA requests formed the basis of the litigation which made its way to the Supreme Court. The first FOIA Request was filed prior to Kissinger's removal of the telephone notes from the premises of the State Department. *Id.* at 143. The second and third Requests were filed after Kissinger announced his gift of his telephone notes and their placement in the Library of Congress. The State Department denied each of the FOIA requests on the basis that the telephone notes were not agency records subject to FOIA disclosure. As to the second and third requests, the State Department also denied the requests because the deposit of the notes with the Library of Congress meant those notes were not in the Department's custody and control. *Id.* at 143-44. There was some dispute between the State Department and Kissinger regarding whether the removal of the records violated the Federal Records and Records Disposal Acts, and the State Department requested Kissinger return the records to the State Department. Kissinger ultimately declined to respond to requests from the Department to provide documents to them. *Id.* at 144.

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Plaintiffs, the FOIA Requesters, filed suit against the Department of State, Secretary of State, Library of Congress, and Kissinger in an attempt to force disclosure of the records under FOIA. *Id.* at 144-45. The district court recognized that FOIA did not directly provide relief because the records were in the custody of the Library of Congress, not an "agency" for purposes of FOIA. Nonetheless, the district court invoked its equitable powers and ordered "the return of wrongfully removed agency documents where a statutory retrieval action appears unlikely." *Id.* at 145. The district court entered an order requiring the Library to return documents to the Department of State, and requiring the Department of State to provide responsive materials to the Plaintiffs. *Id.* The Court of appeals affirmed. *Id.* at 145-46.

The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the district court did not possess authority to order the Library of Congress to return documents to the Department of State because even if the telephone notes were agency records, and were wrongfully removed by Kissinger, FOIA did not confer jurisdiction on the federal courts to impose the remedy. *Id.* at 146-47. The Court first addressed Plaintiffs' claims under the Records Act, clarifying that federal courts lack jurisdiction to adjudicate a claim by a private party that the Act has been violated. Id. at 149-50. The Court further clarified that FOIA does not permit private actions to recover records wrongfully removed from Government custody. Id. at 150. The Court looked closely at the meaning of the word "withhold" as used in FOIA, concluding that agency "possession or control is a prerequisite to FOIA disclosure duties." *Id.* at 152. The Court noted that FOIA "does not obligate agencies to create or retain documents; it only obligates them to provide access to those which it in fact has created and retained." Id. "It is therefore clear that Congress never intended when it enacted the FOIA, to displace the statutory scheme embodied in the Federal Records Act and the Federal Records Disposal Act, providing for administrative remedies to safeguard against wrongful removal of agency records as well as to retrieve wrongfully removed records." *Id.* at 154.

Defendant wholly denies the truth of Mr. Buckovetz's allegations regarding actions purportedly taken by or at the direction of the former Commanding General of the MCRD.

Nonetheless, even taking as true Mr. Buckovetz's speculative allegation that there existed additional emails which were intentionally deleted or concealed by the General so they could not be produced by the Navy, the Complaint fails to allege that Defendant has withheld documents within its "possession or control" from production in response to his FOIA Request. Mr. Buckovetz's claims in this case are based upon pure speculation. Mr. Buckovetz has in his possession the declaration prepared by the Defendant in Case No. 18cv2736-MDD(KSC) regarding the search undertaken to respond to his prior allegation relating to the sufficiency of the agency's search in response to his 2015 and 2018 FOIA Requests. Nonetheless, the Complaint in this case makes no effort to describe how the Navy's search for responsive records has been inadequate.

Instead, Mr. Buckovetz alleges that the prior search was inadequate because of his speculation regarding the existence of phantom emails which were allegedly destroyed by or at the direction of an individual. Mr. Buckovetz alleges the Defendant violated FOIA by withholding documents which are, by his own allegations, not in the possession or control of the Defendant. Because FOIA only authorizes this court to (a) enjoin the agency from withholding agency records, and (b) order the production of any agency records improperly withheld from the complainant, the Court lacks jurisdiction to grant the relief sought by Mr. Buckovetz by way of his current Complaint. The Court should dismiss Mr. Buckovetz's claim for lack of jurisdiction.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Defendant respectfully moves the Court to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint for lack of jurisdiction.

DATED: August 5, 2021

Respectfully submitted,

RANDY S. GROSSMAN Acting United States Attorney

Assistant U.S. Attorney Attorneys for Defendant

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